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Abstract 
Reliable communication between parties in a network is a basic requirement for executing any 
protocol. In this work, we consider the effect on reliable communication when some pairs of 
parties have common authentication keys. The pairs sharing keys define a natural “authentication 
graph”, which may be quite different from the “communication graph” of the network. We 
characterize when reliable communication is possible in terms of these two graphs, focusing 
on the very strong setting of a Byzantine adversary with unlimited computational resources. 
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1. Introduction 
Suppose that some processors are connected by a network of reliable channels. All of 
the processors cooperate to execute some protocol, but some of them are maliciously 
faulty. Dolev [4] and Dolev et al. [5] proved that if there are t faulty processors, 
then every pair of processors can communicate reliably if and only if the network 
is (2t + 1)-connected. What happens if we want to tolerate more faulty processors? 
Adding more reliable channels is costly, so we suggest a simpler solution: giving 
some pairs of processors (other than the pairs connected by channels) authentication 
keys, i.e., the means to identify messages from the other. We show how to extend the 
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authentication capabilities of a distributed environment through interaction to enable 
reliable communication. 
Reliable communication involves a transmitter which sends a message to a receiver. 
There are two versions of this problem: “single-pair” and “all-pairs”. For single-pair 
reliable communication, we specify the transmitter and receiver, and want to succeed 
against any coalition of at most t faulty processors. For all-pairs reliable communi- 
cation, we want to succeed for any transmitter, any receiver, and any coalition of at 
most t faulty processors. The network of channels defines a natural “communication 
graph”, with an edge between two vertices for every channel between two processors. 
The pairs of parties sharing authentication keys define a natural “authentication graph”, 
with an edge between two vertices for every shared key. 
Success for the all-pairs reliable communication problem depends in a natural way 
on the connectivity of these graphs. We show that all-pairs reliable communication is 
possible if and only if the communication graph is (t + 1 )-connected and the union 
of the two graphs is (2t + I)-connected. The proof of sufficiency is constructive, and 
we present an ejjficient protocol that achieves reliable communication whenever it is 
possible. 
When there is a specific sender a and a specific receiver b, the situation is not so 
straightforward. It might seem reasonable to conjecture that reliable communication 
is possible if and only if the communication graph is (t + 1)-connected between a 
and b and the union of the two graphs is (2t + I)-connected between a and 6. This 
condition is necessary, but not sufficient. A natural way to strengthen the condition 
is to require that the communication graph is (t + 1)-connected everywhere, not just 
between a and b. This strengthened condition is sufficient, but not necessary. We give 
an exact characterization when a can transmit a message to b. However, the protocol 
we present for proving the sufficiency of the characterization is not efficient (it requires 
2’(““‘an) rounds, where n is the number of processors in the network). It remains an 
open problem to characterize when efficient communication from a to b is possible. 
To develop a characterization for single-pair reliable communication, we find it useful 
to characterize yet a third version of the problem: “single-pair fault-restricted”. In this 
version, we specify the sender a, the receiver b, and two fault sets To, T,. We wish to 
transmit a message reliably from a to b under the assumption that either To or TI con- 
tains all of the faulty processors. This version of the problem is not so straightforward 
either. Our necessary and sufficient condition for single-pair fault-restricted reliable 
communication depends critically on a recursively defined graph which includes all the 
edges of the communication graph and some of the edges of the authentication graph. 
Somewhat surprisingly, it turns out that single-pair fault-restricted reliable communi- 
cation from a to b does not imply single-pair fault-restricted reliable communication 
from b to a. 
We also explore reliable and private communication, i.e., communication in which 
the faulty processors learn no information about the transmitted message. We show 
that all-pairs reliable and private communication is possible whenever all-pairs reliable 
communication is (provided that the communication channels are private). This also 
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characterizes when all secure multiparty computation are possible in partially authenti- 
cated networks, as Ben-Or et al. [l] and Chaum et al. [3] show that all-pairs reliable 
and private communication implies the possibility of any secure multiparty computation 
(when less than a third of the parties are maliciously faulty). We further prove that 
reliable and private communication from a to b is possible whenever we have reliable 
communication from a to b and from b to a. 
1.1. Historical notes 
The connectivity requirements for several distributed tasks in several models has been 
studied in many papers; for example Byzantine agreement [4], approximate Byzantine 
agreement [6,18], reliable message transmission [4,5], and reliable and private message 
transmission [5,16]. Simple impossibility results and references can be found in [8]. 
We mention that in Byzantine agreement all honest parties should agree on the same 
message while in reliable communication only the transmitter and the receiver agree 
on the message. 
Digital signatures have been used for Byzantine agreement, see, e.g. [ 151 and dis- 
cussion and references in [ 131 (some of these reference use the term authentication 
for digital signatures). Signatures are stronger than authenticated messages, which are 
used in our work. They enable the signer to sign the message such that every other 
party can verify the signature, but cannot sign a different message. To the best of our 
knowledge, no previous papers addressed reliability in partially authenticated networks. 
The tasks we consider in this paper bear some relation to practical group communica- 
tion tasks [lo]. Reliable multicast protocols are often designed to operate in distributed 
adversarial environments similar to the ones we consider. When these multicast proto- 
cols are built on top of a network of reliable single-receiver channels, then they could 
be implemented directly from our results. It is an interesting research question to find 
more direct and efficient implementations of reliable multicast using our techniques. 
1.2. Organization 
In Section 2, we describe our model, and supply background definitions. In Sec- 
tion 3, we characterize the all-pairs reliable communication problem. In Section 4, 
we characterize the single-pair fault-restricted reliable communication problem, which 
is used in Section 5 to characterize the single-pair reliable communication problem. 
Finally, in Section 6, we discuss private communication. 
2. Preliminaries 
2.1. The model 
The system is synchronous and is composed of n parties connected by an incomplete 
network. We describe the network by an undirected graph G = (V, E), where V is the 
188 A. Beimel, M. Frunklin I Theoretical Computer Sciencr 220 (1999) 185-210 
set of parties in the network (i.e., 1 VI = n), and E describes the communication 
channels. That is, there is an edge (u, v) in E if and only if there is a communication 
channel between u and u. We assume that these communication channels are reliable: 
an adversary that does not control u or v (but might control all other vertices in 
the network) cannot change or delete a message sent on the edge (u,v) or insert a 
message on the channel. We assume that some pairs of parties share authentication 
keys (to be discussed in Section 2.2). We describe which pairs of parties have a 
common authentication key by a graph GA = (V, EA). That is, u and u have a common 
key, denoted by k,,., if and only if (u, U) E EA. These keys are chosen according to 
some known probability distribution, and every set of vertices has no information on 
the keys of disjoint edges (except for their a-priori probability distribution). 
We consider protocols for message transmission, in which a transmitter a E V wants 
to transmit a message m to a receiver b E V. We assume that the system is synchronous. 
That is, a protocol proceeds in rounds; at the beginning of each round each party 
v E V sends messages to some of its neighbors in the graph G. These messages get 
to the neighbors before the beginning of the next round. The protocol specifies which 
messages each party sends to its neighbors in each round. The messages sent by a 
party v E Y depend on a local random input held by v, the keys v holds (specified 
in GA), the messages v got in previous rounds, and the number of the round. The 
messages that the transmitter sends can also depend on the message m. We assume 
that all parties in the system know the topology of the graphs G and GA. Furthermore, 
all the parties in the system know in which round party a starts to transmit a message 
to party b. 
During the execution there might be Byzantine attacks (also known as “active at- 
tacks”). An adversary, with an unlimited power, controls a subset T of the parties. 
The adversary knows the protocol, the distribution under which the authentication keys 
where chosen, and the topology of the network (i.e., G and GA). During an execution 
of the protocol, the adversary can choose T dynamically. The inclusion of a party can 
be done any time before, during, or after the execution of the protocol. For every party 
in T, the adversary knows all the messages received by that party, its random inputs, 
and its keys. From the moment a party is included into T, the adversary determines the 
messages this party sends thereafter (possibly deviating from the protocol specification 
in an arbitrary manner). 
Our results remain true versus a stronger “rushing” adversary. Intuitively, a rushing 
adversary can delay the determination of parties to corrupt and messages to send until 
the “last possible moment” of every round. 
Definition 1 (Reliuble Protocol). Let a,b E V be a transmitter and a receiver, and 
t bn - 2. We say that a message transmission protocol from a to b is (t, E)-reliable if, 
when the adversary can control any set T of at most t parties such that T C V \ {a, b}, 
for every message m the probability that b accepts the message m, given that a trans- 
mitted m, is at least 1 -a, where the probability is over the random inputs of the parties, 
the distribution of the authentication keys, and the random input of the adversary. 
A. Beimel, M. Franklin I Theoretical Computer Science 220 (1999) 185-210 189 
At the end of a protocol there are three options: (1) b accepts the message transmitted 
by a, or (2) h accepts an incorrect message (different than the message transmitted 
by a), or (3) b detects that the transmission has failed. We say that the protocol is 
perfectly detecting if b never accepts an incorrect message, i.e., the second option 
never happens. 
In the rest of the paper we distinguish between sending a message and transmitting 
it; a messages is sent on an edge or a path, while a transmission of a message means 
executing a protocol in which a transmitter transmits a message to a receiver (there is 
only one transmitter and one receiver). Similarly, a message is received on an edge 
or a path, while a message is accepted by the receiver at the end of a transmission 
protocol. 
2.2. Authentication schemes 
We briefly define authentication schemes; the reader is referred to [ 171 for more 
details. Let s be a positive integer and K be a finite set, called the set of keys. 
An authentication scheme for messages in (0, 1 }” is a pair (AUTH, p), where AUTH : 
(0, 1)" x K + (0, l} * is a function, and p is a probability distribution on the set of 
keys, K. Assume that a pair of parties, Alice and Bob, share a common key k E, K. 
If Alice wants to authenticate a message m, she computes the value m = AUTH(m, k ) 
and sends to Bob the message m together with the authentication tag a. When Bob 
receives a pair m, c(, he verifies that the authentication is correct by computing the value 
AUTH(m, k) and comparing it to CI. If they are equal then Bob assumes that the message 
was transmitted by Alice. The scheme is secure if an eavesdropper Eve, knowing 
(AUTH,~) but not k, cannot generate a pair which Bob accepts. Formally, the scheme 
(AUTH,~) is called an (e,s)-authentication scheme if every probabilistic strategy that 
sees any & pairs, (mi,AUTH(mi,k)), (mz,AUTH(mz,k)),. .., (mc,AUTH(m/,k)), cannot 
generate, with probability greater than E, a pair m, LX, such that m # mi for every i, and 
z = AUTH(m, k), where the probability is over the distribution of the authentication 
keys, and the random input of the probabilistic strategy. 
We note that one can use short keys to authenticate long messages while provid- 
ing information theoretic security. For example, Krawczyk [ 11, 121 constructs efficient 
([,c)-authentication schemes in which the length of the message is s, the length of the 
authentication tag is O(log(s/s)) and the length of the key is O(dlog(s/s)). 
Remark 2. In our definitions we consider information-theoretic authentication schemes 
and our protocols are immune against an adversary with unlimited power. A differ- 
ent way to present our results is to assume that the authentication schemes are only 
computationally secure (i.e., any eficient algorithm cannot break the scheme with non- 
negligible probability), and assume that the adversary is an efficient algorithm. For our 
reliable protocols in Sections 3-5, any successful attack implies a successful break 
of the underlying authentication scheme; this is not true for the private and reliable 
protocol of Section 6. 
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SUBPROTOCOL TRANSMIT-EDGE 
(i) Vertex u authenticates the message m with the key k,,” using a (1, .s,/(2nt)) 
authentication scheme. 
(ii) Vertex u sends the authenticated message on t + 1 vertex disjoint paths in G. 
(iii) If ti receives an authenticated message m’ on any one of the t + 1 paths, and 
if no message other than nt’ arrives authenticated on any other path, 
than v accepts m’ as the tmnsm~~ed message. 
Otherwise, Y accepts nothing. 
Fig. 1. A subprotocol for transmitting a massage on an edge from GA. 
2.3. canne~tivit~? 
The reliability of a network is closely related to its connectivity. In this work we 
consider vertex connectivity of undirected graphs. A path P passes through a set T 
if there is a vertex u E T in the path. Otherwise, we say that P misses T. A set 
T C V \ {u, v} is called a (u, v)-separating set if every path between u and u passes 
through T. A graph G = (V,E) is (t + 1, 26, v)-connected if there is no (u, v)-separating 
set of size at most t. A graph G is t-connected if it is (t, u, v)-connected for every pair 
of vertices in the graph. Menger [ 141 proved that a graph G is (t, u, v)-connected if and 
only if (u,v~ E E or there exists t vertex disjoint paths between u and z). Furthermore, 
there is an efficient algorithm that checks whether a graph is (t, u,v)-connected (for 
details see e.g. 171). Notice that if there is an edge between u and u then the graph is 
(t, u, v)-connected for every t and there is no (u, v)-separating set. 
3. AU-pairs reliable communication 
In this section we characterize when reliable transmission between every pair of 
parties is possible. We prove that, when some pairs of parties share authentication 
keys, reliable transmission is possible if and only if the communication graph is (t + l)- 
connected and the union of the communication and authentication graphs is (2t + l)- 
connected. 
3.1. Sufjiciency 
Theorem 3. If the graph G is (t + l)-connected and the graph G U GA is (2t + l)- 
connected, then for every E > 0 there is an eficient protocol for (t,&)-reliable mes- 
sage transmission ~et~~een any pair of parties which uses a (1, ~~(2nt))-authentication 
scheme. Furthermore, the protocol is perfectly detecting. 
We first describe in Fig. 1 a subprotocol for sending messages reliably on edges in 
GA. In Lemma 4 we prove its correctness. 
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PROTOCOL SIMPLE-TRANSMIT(m) 
(i) The transmitter sends the message M to a receiver on 2t + 1 disjoint paths in 
the graph G U GA: 
_ The transmitter sends the message to the first vertices in the paths, and 
each intermediate vertex propagates the messages to the next vertex 
on the path until it reaches the receiver. 
- To propagate a message on an edge (u,u) from GA, vertex u uses 
Subprotocol TRANSMITEDGE. 
- If a propagation on an edge from GA fails, then no messages 
is propagated to the receiver on this path (at least not by honest parties). 
(ii) The receiver accepts a message if it is received on at least t + 1 
of the 2t f 1 paths. Otherwise, the receiver accepts nothing. 
Fig. 2. A protpcol for transmitting a massage when G is 1 i- 1 connected and G U GA is 2t + 1 connected. 
Lemma 4. If the grffph G is (t + I )-connected then for every edge (u, v) E Gzd and 
for every E > 0, Subprotocol TRANSMITEDGE, described in Fig, 1, is an ejijcient 
(t,E/(2n))-reliable protocol for transmitting a message from u to v which uses a 
(1, ~/(2nt))-u~thenticution scheme. Furthermore, ~ubprotocol T~NSM~T~DGE is 
perfectly detecting. 
Proof. Since there are at most t Byzantine vertices, v will receive the right authenti- 
cated message on at least one path. Thus L’ will accept he correct message whenever z: 
does not receive a different authenticated message on another path. The probability that 
the adversary can cause v to receive a different authenticated message on another path 
is bounded by t times the probability of the adversary forging a single authenticated 
message, i.e., t + .$(2nt) = q/(2n). If z1 receives a different authenticated message on 
another path, then v will accept nothing, and thus the subprotocol is perfectly detecting 
(i.e., Y never accepts an incorrect message). q 
In Fig. 2 we describe Protocol SIMPLE-TRANSMIT for reliable message transmis- 
sion. We complete the proof of Theorem 3 by proving that this protocol is reliable 
(Lemma 5) and perfectly detecting (Lemma 6). 
Lemma 5. Protocol SIMPLE-TRANSMIT, described in Fig. 2, is n (t, &)-reliable mes- 
sage transmission protocol between any pair of parties. 
Proof. If the adversary has not disrupted any of the executions of Subprotocol TRANS- 
MIT-EDGE then the correct message is received on at least t + 1 paths and is accepted 
by b. We next give an upper bound on the probability that the adversary disrupts 
one of the executions of the subprotocol. Each vertex, except for the transmitter and 
receiver, appears at most once on each of the 2t + 1 paths. There are at most 2n 
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edges on the union of all the paths. Thus there are at most 2n executions of Subproto- 
co1 TRANSMIT-EDGE. The probability that the adversary can disrupt at least one of 
these executions is bounded by 2n times the probability that the adversary can disrupt 
a single execution, i.e., 2n . a/(2n) = 8. 0 
Lemma 6. Protocol SIMPLE-TRANSMIT, described in Fig. 2, is perfectly detecting. 
Proof. Subprotocol TRANSMIT-EDGE is perfectly detecting. Thus the receiver can 
only receive an incorrect message on a path in G U GA if there is a faulty vertex on 
that path, no matter how many edges in GA are on the path (and no matter how many 
false messages the adversary has managed to authenticate in the subprotocols). Since 
the paths are vertex disjoint, the receiver can receive an incorrect message on at most 
t of the paths, and so will never accept an incorrect message. i? 
3.2. Necessity 
The next theorem states that if the sufficient condition does not hold then reliable 
message transmission is not possible, i.e. it is also a necessary condition. The result 
does not assume how the common keys are used. That is, even if the keys in GA are 
used for purposes other than authentication (e.g., for encryption) then reliable message 
transmission is not possible. Furthermore, the result does not assume any limit on the 
size of the keys. 
Lemma 7. If G is not (t + I)-connected and E < l/2, then there exists a transmitter 
and receiver for which (t, &)-reliable transmission is not possible. 
Proof. If G is not (t + 1 )-connected, then there is a subset T of t vertices that separates 
some pair a, b. Suppose that a wishes to transmit a message to the receiver b. If 
the vertices in T crash-fail then b would not get any information about the message 
transmitted by a. Assuming the message space has at least two possible messages, for 
at least one message a guess by b succeeds with probability at most l/2. 0 
In the next lemma we construct pairs of executions of the protocol in which the 
sender transmits different messages, the adversary controls different subsets of parties, 
and yet the views of the receiver are identical. These “ambiguous” pairs of executions 
are used in Theorem 9 to construct an adversary that disrupts the transmission of a 
message. We stress that Lemma 8 contains no probabilities. If the adversary follows 
the strategy outlined in Fig. 4, then every execution is guaranteed to be part of an 
ambiguous pair. 
Lemma 8. Let a and b be vertices, and To, T1 C V \ {a, 6) be disjoint subsets, such 
that TO U T, is an (a, b)-separating set in G U GA. Assume that there is some protocol 
for message transmission jrom a to b. For every pair of messages rno,m1 there are 
pairs of executions of the protocol such that in one execution TO is Byzantine and 
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Fig. 3. A description of the partition of the vertices. 
the message transmitted by a is mo, in the other execution TI is Byzantine and the 
message transmitted by a is ml, and the receiver b gets exactly the same messages 
in both executions. 
Proof. Let T = TO U T,, define B as the set of vertices which have a path to b in 
G U GA that misses T (i.e., v E B if T is not a (v, b)-separating set in G U GA), and 
define A as V \ (B U T). Fig. 3 describes these sets. Notice that there are no edges 
between A and B since T is a separating set in G U GA. 
Define two executions 0 and 1 as follows. The vertices in B hold the random inputs 
{rU : u E B} and keys {k,,+ : u E B, v E V, (u, u) E EA} in both executions. In execution 
z E (0, 1 }, the Byzantine set is T,, the message m,, is transmitted, the random inputs of 
the vertices in A U T? are {r: : u E A U T?}, and the authentication keys of pairs in AU T 
are {k& : u, u E A U T, (u, v) E EA }. The behavior of the Byzantine set T, in execution 
a is to send no messages whatsoever to A u T;, and to send to B exactly the same 
messages that are sent to B by the (honest) T, in execution 2. 
In order for the Byzantine T, to behave as specified in execution z, the adversary 
needs to simulate the behavior of A U T, in execution 2. To achieve this task, the 
adversary simulates, round by round, the behavior of the vertices in A U T, for ex- 
ecution 2, using {r: : u E A U TZ} as the random inputs for the vertices in A U T,, 
and {k:,, : u E A U T,, II E A U T, (u,v) E EA} and {k,,, : u E T,, u E B, (u,v) E EA} as 
the keys held by parties in A U T,. At the beginning of each round, each simulated 
party has a history of messages that it got in the simulation of the previous rounds, 
its simulated local random input, and its simulated keys. The simulated party sends 
during the simulation the same messages that the honest party would send in the orig- 
inal protocol in the same state. The simulated messages that T, sends to B are really 
sent by the parties. All other messages are used only to update the history for the next 
round. The messages which are added to the history of each simulated vertex are the 
real messages that are sent by the parties in B and the simulated messages that are 
sent by the vertices in A U T,. No messages from T? are added to the history. These 
two executions are described in Fig. 4. 
The history of messages of each simulated vertex in execution z is the same as the 
history of the vertex in execution 2. Therefore, the messages sent by To and T, to 
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Byzantine set 
Execution 0 
To 
Execution 1 
Ti 
Real execution of A 
Real message 
Random inputs 
Keys of A U T 
Behavior 
m0 mi 
{r,O:u~AuTr) (r; : u E A u TOf 
{$,, : (4 u) E Ed} { qt, : (% 4 E & } 
TO sends no msgs to A U 7’1 Ti sends no msgs to A U To 
Simulation of A by the Byzantine set 
Simulation 
Random inputs 
Keys ofAU7’ 
Behavior 
{r; m’ :z&WTo} {rz m0 XEAUT,} 
{k&> : (zf, Z?) E EA > {kg& : (u, I)) E E‘4 > 
T, sends no msgs to A U ?ii TO sends no msgs to A U T, 
Fig. 4. The two executions that confuse b. 
members of B in both executions are exactly the same, and the members of B, and in 
particular b, receive and send the same messages in both executions. Thus, the receiver 
b cannot distinguish whether the set 7’s is Byzantine and the message transmitted by 
a is mo, or the set Ti is Byzantine and the message transmi~ed by a is ml. q 
Theorem 9. If (t, &)-reliable transmission is possible between any pair of parties with 
E < l/2, then the graph G is (t + 1 ~-~onnee~e~ and the graph G U G.4 is (2t + I)- 
connected. 
Proof. Assume that G u GA is not (2s + I)-connected, and assume that there is some 
protocol for message transmission from a to b in G U GA. There exist vertices a, b and 
an (a, b)-separating set T in G U GA of at most 2t vertices. Let TO, TI be an arbitrary 
partition of T into two disjoint sets of size at most t, and fix any mo # ml. Consider 
all the pairs of executions from Lemma 8, where the random inputs {I: : u E A U Ti ), 
? 
&uEAUT~} and {Y,~ : u E B}, and keys {k& : u,v E -4 U T,(qu) E EA}, 
k& : u, v E A U T, (u, v) E EA } and {& : u E B, v E V, (u, u) E EA} range over all their 
possible values. In each pair of executions, whenever b accepts the correct message in 
one execution it errs in the second. Thus, for any strategy by b for choosing whether 
to receive mo or ml there is some z such that when m2 is transmitted, the receiver 
accepts m, with probability at most l/2. 
Consider the following adversary. The adversary chooses Z as the Byzantine set, 
chooses random local inputs for the parties in A U T,, and chooses keys for pairs of 
parties in A u T according to the same distribution that the real keys are distributed. 
The adversary simulates the parties in A U T, with m,, the keys and the local random 
inputs it chose. The adversary does not try to guess the actual keys and random inputs 
that parties in A u T have, but only chooses them from the same distribution which they 
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are chosen in the real execution. Furthermore, the adversary always tries to convince h 
that rn? is transmitted (even if m: is really transmitted). When a transmits the message 
m,, the receiver b errs with probability at least half. Thus, if G U GA is not (2t + l)- 
connected then the reliability of every protocol is at least l/2. Cl 
4. Single-pair fault-restricted communication 
In this section we consider single-pair fault-restricted comm~ications. That is, the 
sender a transmits a message to the receiver b when one of two given sets 7’0, Tr is 
guaranteed to contain all of the faulty processors. This version of the problem is only a 
tool for characterizing when (&&)-reliable transmission between a given pair of parties 
a and b is possible. In Section 5 we show that if there is a fault-restricted protocol 
for every pair of sets of size t then there is a protocol that is reliable against every 
set of size at most t; in the (&&)-reliable protocol, which we describe in Section 5, the 
transmitter executes the ({TO, Tt } , &)-reliable protocol for every pair of sets of size t 
and the receiver analyzes the information from all these protocols to figure out which 
message was transmitted. 
In this section we present a characterization of single-pair fault-restricted reliable 
communication. The proof of sufficiency is constm~tive, i.e., we present a protocol 
that achieves reliable comm~ication whenever it is possible. However, the protocol is 
not efficient (it requires ZO(““sn) rounds). 
4.1. Ideas of the protocol 
In this section we informally present he ideas of the protocol, and try to motivate 
the definition of a graph G” which is used in the characterization, We sketch a series 
of protocols, relying on increasingly weaker assumptions, and ending with our actual 
protocol. For simplicity, let us assume that the adversary can never authenticate false 
messages unless it holds the authentication key (ignoring for the moment he negligible 
probability that this assumption is violated). 
First Protocol. Suppose that G contains one path from ts to b that misses To and 
another path that misses Tt . If a and b shared an authentication key, the protocol 
could send m, CI on both paths, where a = AUTH(RZ, ka,b). Then b succeeds by accepting 
any message that arrives with the proper authentication. The First Protocol succeeds 
whenever (a, b) E GA and neither 2’0 nor T1 separates a, 6 in G. 
Failure of the First Protocol. Consider Graph 1 in Fig. 5. The First Protocol fails 
for this graph, because a and b do not share an authentication key. However, we can 
succeed for this example as follows. Suppose a authenticates m with k,,, and sends 
it to w through 2’1. If w receives a message with the proper authentication, then w 
authenticates it with kw,b and sends it to b through 7’1; otherwise w sends nothing. 
If 7’1 changes or removes an authenticated message during the protocol, then we say 
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a 
b 
Graph 1 Graph 2 Graph 3 
- Communication edge - - - - Authentication edge 
Fig. 5. Examples of graphs in which a can (I, E)-reliably transmit a message to h 
that TI has “disabled” the corresponding authentication edge. Either b will receive a 
properly authenticated message along this “path”, and will accept it, or b will know 
that T, has disabled at least one authentication edge. Whenever b knows that TI is at 
fault, b accepts whatever was received along the path through To. This is the intuition 
behind our Second Protocol. 
Second Protocol. Consider the graph G’ obtained from G U GA by removing all 
authentication edges (u, V) such that ro is a (u, v)-separating set in G. Suppose that G 
contains a path that misses TI, while G’ contains a path that misses both To and Tr . 
The transmitter “sends” the message to the receiver on both paths. To “send” over an 
authentication edge means to authenticate with the corresponding key and send on a 
path in G that misses To. The existence of such a path is guaranteed by the definition 
of G’. At the end of the execution of the protocol, if the receiver has gotten a message 
on the path in G’ that misses both TO and TI, then this message is accepted. Otherwise, 
the receiver accepts the message sent along the path in G that misses 7-1. 
To summarize, the idea of this protocol is to get information on the Byzantine set 
from the fact that a message was not received on a certain path. Either the Byzantine 
set does not disable an edge and the receiver learns the message, or the Byzantine set 
does disable an edge and the receiver learns which set is Byzantine. 
Failure of the Second Protocol. Consider Graph 2 in Fig. 5. The Second Protocol 
fails for this graph, because there is no path in G’ that misses both TO and rt. However, 
we can succeed for this example as follows. The message is sent along the two simple 
paths from a to b in G, one through TO and one through T,. In addition, the message 
is sent along the “authentication path” through U, v, and w. This authentication path 
will either deliver the correct message, or it will expose the Byzantine set and allow 
b to choose between the messages received along the simple paths. For the first hop 
of the authentication path, a authenticates the message with k,,+ and sends it to u 
through TO. Either u receives a properly authenticated message, or u learns that TO is 
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Byzantine. (Note that u will know when an expected message does not arrive, because 
we are assuming a synchronous system in which all parties know when the protocol 
has started.) Now the edge (u, u) is traversed, using the key k,,, to deliver some 
authenticated message from u to u through TO. This message will either be the same 
message that u received or the new message “TO is Byzantine” depending on what u 
learned. The remaining hops of the authentication path proceed similarly. Eventually, 
b will either receive a properly authenticated message under kw,,b from w through T, or 
h will know that T, is Byzantine. If b receives a properly authenticated message, then 
that message will either be the correct message from a or it will expose the Byzantine 
set. 
Third Protocol. Consider the graph G” obtained from G U GA by removing all au- 
thentication edges (u,v) such that both TO and TI are a (u,v)-separating set in G. 
Suppose that G contains a path that misses TO and a path that misses T,, while G” 
contains a path that misses both TO and TI. The transmitter “sends” the message to b 
on all three paths. To “send” along an edge (u, v) E GA, the vertex u sends the authen- 
ticated message (m, AUTH(~, k,,)) on a path in G that either misses TO or misses TI. 
Such a path exists by the definition of G”, and we can assume that all parties includ- 
ing b know what this path is. If v does not receive a properly authenticated message, 
then v sends an alert message “v has not received a message from u” to b. This alert 
message is propagated to b along the path in G” in the same manner as the regular 
message. Eventually, either b will receive the correct message on the path in G”, or 
the Byzantine set will disable at least one edge and b will receive an appropriate alert 
message. From this information, b will know which message to accept from the simple 
paths in G. 
Fuilure of the Third Protocol. Consider Graph 3 in Fig. 5. The Third Protocol fails 
for this graph, because the edge (u, w) does not get included in G”. That is, both To 
and Tl separate u and w in G. However, Tl does not separate u and w if we are 
allowed to use (b, w). By the previous analysis, we ought to be allowed to use (b, w), 
since it cannot be disabled without implicating T,. 
Final Protocol. The additional idea in this protocol is that if every 7; that can 
disable an edge is caught, then this edge can be considered as a reliable edge. That 
is, when checking if another authentication edge is reliable we use the edges of G 
as well as those authentication edges which we already established as reliable. This 
motivates the inductive definition of G* in the next section and a recursive protocol 
in Section 4.3. 
4.2. Characterization of single-pair fault-restricted communication 
The intuition behind the definition of the graph G* is that it contains all the edges 
that cannot be disabled without b learning which set disabled them. We formally define 
G*, and from G* the notion of a “confusing pair”: 
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Definition 10. (The graph G*) Let a, b E Y be the transmitter and receiver, and To, T, C 
V \ {a,b} be a pair of sets. We inductively define a sequence of subsets of authenti- 
cation edges EO C El C E2 C . . ., where EO = 8 and (u, v) E Ei whenever the following 
properties hold: 
(i) (~,a) E EA. 
(ii) U,U # TOUT,. 
(iii) At most one of TO or TI is a (u, u)-separating set in Gi- 1 = (V, E U Ei- I). 
(iv) Either v or u is in the connected component of b in the graph 
If Ek+i = Ek for every integer i> 1 then G* = (V, E*) = (V, E U Ek) (we will prove 
that such k exists). 
The graph G* depends upon b, TO and Tl (it is independent of a). We use the no- 
tation G*(b, To, TI ) when we want to emphasize this dependency. Informally, Property 
(iii) ensures that u learns the Byzantine set if the edge is disabled, and Property (iv) 
ensures that it can tell b about it. As an example for this definition, consider Graph 3 
described in Fig. 5. We first add the edge (w, b) since TO is not a separating set in G. 
Now, the set TI is not a (u, w)-separating set in the current graph and therefore (u, w) 
is added, and finally (a,~) is added. Thus, the Final protocol succeeds in this graph. 
Definition 11. (Confusing Pair) Let TO, T, C V \ {a, b}. The sets TO and 7’1 are an 
(a, b)-conjnsing pair if 
(i) Either TO or T1 is an (a, b)-separating set in G, or 
(ii) The set TO U TI is an (a, b)-separating set in G*(b, TO, T, ). 
Given these definitions, our characterization can now be stated formally. 
Theorem 12. Let To, T, C V \ {a, b} such that (TO, T1) is not an (a, b)-confusing pair. 
Then, for every E > 0, there is u protocol for ({TO, Tl} ,E)-reliable message transmis- 
sion from a to b. 
Theorem 13. Zf (To, T, ) is an (a, b)-confusing pair then ({TO, Tl } , &)-reliable message 
transmission between a and b is not possible with E < 112. 
The protocol for proving Theorem 12 is described in Section 4.3, and the protocol 
is analyzed in Section 4.4. The proof of Theorem 13 is given in Section 4.5. 
4.3. Protocol for proving suJficiency 
First we present Protocol SEND, described in Fig. 6, which sends a message along 
a path from vertex u to vertex v in G*. In this protocol either zi accepts the message 
sent by u or the receiver b learns which set is Byzantine (if the adversary breaks the 
authentication scheme then v might accept an incorrect message). 
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For Protocol SEND we need the following notation. The level of an edge (u, v) E G* 
is the minimum j such that (u,v) E Ej. If (u,v) E E then its level is 0. The level of 
a path is the maximum level of an edge on the path. For every (u, v) E E’ \ E, define 
PATH(~, v) as a fixed path with minimum level among all the simple paths between u 
and v in G* that either miss To or miss rl. Furthermore, for every v that is adjacent to 
an authentication edge (u, v) in G’, define PATH-TO-~(V) as a fixed path with minimum 
level among all the paths from v to b in G’ which miss To U T,. (It is possible that 
PATH-TO-b(v) # PATH(v, b).) The following proposition is an immediate consequence 
of Definition 10: 
Proposition 14. If (u, v) E Ej then 
_ The level of PATH(U,V) is at most j - 1. 
~ The levels of PATH-TO-b(v) and PATH-TO-b(u) are at WZOSt j. 
_ Furthermore, the level qf either PATH_TO.b(v) or PATH-TO-b(u) is at most j - 1. 
If (u,v) E Ej and the level PATH-TO-b(v) is j (thus, u is in the connected compo- 
nent of b in the graph (V \ (To U Tl ), E U Ej-1) while v is not) then PATH-TO-b(v) z 
v,PATH_TO_b(u). All the parties in V know PATH(u,v) and PATH-TO-b(v), which are 
part of the specification of the protocol. 
In Procedure SEND, described in Fig. 6, there are two recursive calls to SEND. The 
call at line (i) is part of the propagation of the message on P and is called an internal 
call. The call at line (iii) informs the receiver b whether vi+1 has accepted a message, 
and is called an alert call. The alert call can be executed in parallel to the rest of the 
protocol. 
Procedure SEND has a Boolean parameter Destb, which indicates if the final des- 
tination of the message is b. The purpose of this mysterious parameter is to ensure 
that if the final destination of a message is b and the message is sent on a path of 
level j, then all alert calls use paths whose level is less than j. This enables to analyze 
the properties of Procedure SEND in Lemma 20. We stress that Destb=TRUE is not 
equivalent to the condition that b is the last vertex in the path P (the second parameter 
of SEND). For example, if (w, b) is an authentication edge in P then there would be 
an internal recursive call to SEND with PATH(~, b). In this case the final destination 
of the message is the last vertex in P and therefore Destb=FALSE. 
In Fig. 7 we describe Protocol TRANSMIT in which a transmits a message to b. In 
this protocol the transmitter sends the message on three paths and the receiver accepts 
one of the messages received on these paths. 
4.4. Proof of suficiency 
We first establish that the execution of SEND(m,P,Destb) always terminates, al- 
though it might take as many as 2’(” log’) rounds. To prove this statement we con- 
sider the graph G’, and prove that it is properly defined. That is, the sequence of 
subsets of authentication edges of Definition 10 converges to some Ek for some 
k<n. 
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PROCEDURE SEND(m, P, Destb) 
m - a message, 
P = v(),v1,..., vf - a path in G*, 
Destb - Boolean variable, TRUE if the final destination of the message is h. 
rno +-- m. 
FOR i = 0 TO L - 1 DO (* z‘i propagates the message to Ui+l *) 
IF (ZJi,Ui+l) E E THEN v, sends rni to vi+1 on this edge and M~+I +-- mi, 
OTHERWISE, (tli, tJi+l) E EA: 
(i) vj executes 
SEND((mi, AUTH(mi,k,,,,,+, )),pAT~(ui, Ui+I), FALSE). 
(* This is an internal call. *) 
(ii) IF vi+1 received (riz,d) such that oi f ~~~~(rfi,k,!~,~~+,) 
THEN mi+l C- “vi+, has not accepted a message from vi”, 
OTHERWISE, IF Destb = TRUE 
THEN rni+l +“t)i+j accepted a message from D~“o&, 
OTHERWISE, rn;+i +-- &. 
(iii) IF (Destb = FALSE) THEN vi+1 executes (in parallel) 
SEND( “alert”0 mi+ 1, PATH-TO&( TRUE). 
This an alert *) 
Fig. A to send a a path G*. 
PROTOCOL TRANSMIT(m) 
The transmitter a executes SEND to b three times: 
SEND(m,P*,TRUE) - PO is a path from a to b in G which misses To. 
SEND(m, P,,TRUE) - PI is a path from a to b in G which misses 7’1. 
SEND(m, PATH_TO_~(~),TRUE) 
[F the receiver b has received a message on PATH_TO_~(~) 
THEN b accepts it. 
OTHERWISE, b learns that Ti is Byzantine for some i. 
b accepts the message received on Pi. 
Fig. 7. A procedure to transmit a message from n to h 
Lemma 15. Let G and GA be any graphs, and E. C_ El Cr E2 C . . . be the sequence qf 
subsets of authentication edges qf D~~nit~~n 10. Then, E,+i = E, .for every integer 
i> 1. 
Proof. Denote & as the set of vertices in the connected component of b in (V \ (TO U 
Tl ), E U Et). If Bi = Bi- 1 then Ek = Ei for every k 3 i (since (u, v) E EA is added to 
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& if and only if v E Bk-1 and there exists a path in G, which misses some Ti, from 
u to some w E Bk_1). Since B; C V, the size of Bi can increase at most IZ - 1 times 
and the lemma follows. 0 
Lemma 16. Let j he the level of P. The execution of SEND(m, P, Destb) terminutrs 
after ut most O(nj+’ ) = 2O(““g”) rounds. 
Proof. The proof is by induction on the level of P. If the level of P is 0 then O(n) 
rounds suffice for sending a message along P which is a simple path in G. For the 
induction step, observe that the alert recursive calls are executed in parallel to the rest 
of the execution. Thus, the number of rounds in which the protocol terminates is the 
sum of the number of rounds of each internal recursive call and the maximum number 
of rounds required for an alert recursive call. The level of every path in a recursive 
internal call is at most j- 1, where j is the level of P. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, 
each recursive internal call takes nj rounds, and the execution of P terminates after at 
most n . n’ = &I rounds since the length of P in G* is at most n. 
Now examine the time required for each alert call for an authentication edge (u, ti) 
in P. If the level of PATH-TO-~(U) is at most j - 1 then the message is propagated 
to b 
b should 
receive a message saying that the message was received. The receiver b knows that 
PATH(~, v) misses Z’i, and thus Tir must be Byzantine. 
Consider an execution by v of SEND(m, PATH_TO~(U),TRUE), where m is either 
an alert message or a regular message. Assume that the adversary has not authenticated 
any message without having the authentication key. If there were no Byzantine parties 
then the message b receives on PATH-TO-~(V) is of the form: 
“vi,+l accepted a message from vi,“’ . 
. ..o “oil+1 accepted a message from v;,“om’, (1) 
where m’ = m and (Of,, Ui, +I ), . . . , (vi,, ui,+ 1) are the authentication edges on 
PATH_TOb(v). We say that the received message is syntactically correct if the prefix 
of the message is as it is in (1) (with all authentication edges from the path). The 
next proposition follows from the fact that PATH_TO_b(v) misses all possible Byzantine 
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parties in TO U TI and only parties on the path can change the message received on the 
path. 
Proposition 17. If b receives a syntactically correct message and the adversary has 
not authenticated any message without having the authentication key, then m’ (the 
suffix of the message) was transmitted b)J v. 
We next assume that the received message is not s~ta~tically correct. In this case 
b will detect a set z that contains all Byzantine vertices. There are three cases to 
consider: 
(i) b receives and accepts all alert messages sent during the execution, and all of 
them have the form “alert, vifl accepted a message from ~~“06~. 
(ii) b receives and accepts all alert messages sent during the execution, and at least 
one of them has the form “alert, Q+I has not accepted a message from q”. 
(iii) b does not accept some alert messages sent during the execution. 
In the next two claims we show how b detects the Byzantine set if it received all 
alert messages. 
Claim 18. Asszwe that b does not receive a synta~t~~a~~y correct ~nessa~e and it 
receives and accepts all alert messages ent during the execution, and all of them 
have the form “alert, vi+1 accepted a message from Z)i”oG. Then b can detect the 
Byzantine set. 
Proof. Only authentication edges not adjacent to possible Byzantine parties in To u Tt 
are added to G”. Thus, when b accepts an alert message claiming that a vertex uj+[ 
has accepted a message from vi then ~i_~_l really accepted this message. 
If the conditions of the claim hold then no authentication edge was disabled dur- 
ing the recursive calls and the only authentication edges that were disabled are on 
PATH_TO~(V). In this case the message that b receives on PATH-TO&(V) is “vi+l has 
not accepted a message from vi” for some (Vi,Vj+l) on PATH(v, b), and this message 
can be trusted since PATH-TO&(V) contains no Byzantine parties. There is only one 
set that hits PATH(Vi, Vi+, ) and b learns that this set must be Byzantine. q 
Claim 19. Assume that b does not receive a syntactically correct message and it 
receives and accepts all alert ~nessa~es sent during the execution, and at least one 
of them has the form ‘hlert, vi+] has not accepted a message from vi”. Then b can 
detect the Byzantine set. 
Proof. Let (x, y) be the first authentication edge for which b receives an alert message 
claiming that “y has not accepted a message from x”. That is, x got the message 
transmitted by v and no edge used in the recursive calls during the execution of 
SEND(m, PATH(X, y),FALSE) was disabled, and the edge (x, y) was disabled by a 
vertex on PATH(~,~) which did not propagate the message it got. There is only one 
set that hits PATH(X,~) and b learns that this set must be Byzantine. Cl 
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Lemma 20. Assume that v executes SEND(m,PATH_TOJ(v),TRUE), where m is ei- 
ther an alert message or u regular message. If the adversary has not authenticated 
any message without having the authentication key, then either b accepts the message 
sent by v or b can identify which set is Byzantine. 
Proof. If b receives a syntactically correct message on the path then b accepts the 
suffix of the message. By Proposition 17 this is a correct decision. Otherwise, we 
prove the lemma by induction on the level of PATH-TO-b(v). If the level is zero, this 
is a path in G that misses all possible Byzantine parties in TO U TI, thus b receives a 
syntactically correct message on this path. 
Now, let PATH-TO-~(V) be a path of level j > 0. If all alert messages are received 
and accepted by b then, by Claim 18 and Claim 19, the receiver b detects which set 
is Byzantine. Otherwise, we use a “missing” alert message to detect the Byzantine set. 
Alert messages are only sent during recursive calls (when Destb = FALSE). Thus, 
by Proposition 14, every alert message is sent on a path PATH-TO-~(W) for some vertex 
w such that the level of PATH-TO-b(w) is at most j - 1. Therefore, the alert messages 
which b does not accept are sent on paths of level at most j - 1, and by the induction 
hypothesis b detects which set is Byzantine. 0 
We are ready to prove the sufficient condition: 
Proof (Theorem 12). Protocol TRANSMIT, described in Fig. 7, satisfies the 
requirements of the Theorem. First notice that by Definition 11 the paths Po,P, and 
PATH-TO-b(a) exist. By Lemma 20, if the adversary has not authenticated a false mes- 
sage, b receives the message transmitted by a. Let L be the maximum number of times 
that any single authentication key is used, and let k be the total number of times that 
all of the authentication keys are used; by Lemma 16 both of these values are well- 
defined. Using an ({,8/k)-authentication scheme ensures that the probability that the 
adversary has authenticated a false message is at most E. 0 
4.5. Proof of necessity 
We next prove the necessary condition, that is, if (TO, Tl) is an (a, b)-confusing pair 
in G’ then reliable transmission is not possible. 
Proof (Theorem 13). If TO or Ti is an (a, b)-separating set in G then when they crash- 
fail no message transmission is possible. Otherwise, the proof is a generalization of 
the proof of Theorem 9. Recall that the idea of the proof of Theorem 9 is to construct 
pairs of “ambiguous” executions in which different messages are transmitted while the 
receiver gets exactly the same messages. This is done in Lemma 8, and is used in 
Theorem 9 to construct an adversary that disrupts the transmission of one message. 
Unlike Lemma 8, the set TO U T, is not a separating set in G U GA but rather in G*, 
that is, we have to deal with the authentication edges deleted from G*. The proof of 
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Lemma 8 should be generalized to this case. Once we have done this, Theorem 13 
follows from the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 9. 
In Lemma 8 we consider a pair of executions, in one execution To is Byzantine, and 
a transmits ma and in the second T, is Byzantine, and a transmits ml. The Byzantine 
set Ti in one execution sends the same messages as the honest T; sends in the other 
executions. We next mention the modifications to the proof of Lemma 8. We define 
the sets A and B with respect to G*. Formally, define B as the set of vertices that 
have a path in G* to b that does not use any vertex from TO U T,. That is, v E B 
if v E V \ TO U TI and TO U T1 is not a (v, b)-separating set in G*. Furthermore, let 
A z V \ (B U TO U TI ). Since (TO, TI) is an (a, b)-confusing pair, a E A. 
There are two problems to generalize the proof. The minor problem is that TO and 
T, can intersect. To solve this problem, the parties in TO n TI (which are Byzantine in 
both executions) do not send any messages. The major problem is that while simulating 
the parties in A, the adversary does not know the keys of edges (u, v) E EA, where 
u E A and z: E B. This seems to be a problem, since the parties in B know these keys 
and can distinguish if different keys are used during the simulation. However, TO U T, 
is an (a, b)-separating set in G*, and any edge (u, v) E EA between A and B is an 
authentication edge such that for every w E B both TO and T, are a (u,w)-separating 
set in G (since (u, v) E EA \ E’). Therefore, both sets will disable this edge, and the 
vertices in B might know that the correct key k,, is not used, but will not be able to 
know which set to blame. 
More formally, define a set C CA, where u E C if for every v E B both TO and T, are 
a (u, v)-separating set in G. Consider a pair of executions as defined in Lemma 8, where 
in execution z E (0, 1 } the adversary uses keys { ki,, : u E C, v E B, (u, v) E EA } for the 
simulation (as well as the other keys and random inputs considered in Lemma 8). We 
claim that the messages that are sent by parties in C do not influence B. If u E C 
can influence a party v E B, there must be a path u, WI,. . , w/-l, w/ = v in G such 
that u sends a message to WI, then WI sends a message to w2 that depends on the 
message that it got from u and so on until a message gets to v. This path must pass 
through T, (the Byzantine set). Let wj be the first vertex from T, on the path (i.e., 
U, WI,. . . , w,_l E A U T?). The Byzantine wj ignores the real messages that it gets from 
parties in A U T?,, and thus the messages that it sends do not depend on the message 
sent by U. Similarly, the messages sent by u E C when T, simulates the parties in A do 
not influence the messages it sends to B, since the path from u to a vertex in B passes 
through at least one vertex in Tr and no messages are sent by parties in Ti during 
the simulation. Thus, the simulated messages of u have no influence on the messages 
received by the parties in B, and can be ignored. 0 
4.4. F&t-restricted communication is not symmetric 
One might think that if a can transmit a message to b then b can transmit a message 
to a. However, the definition of G” is not symmetric with respect to a and b, and the 
previous intuition is false. 
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Fig. 8. A graph in which a can transmit to h. but b cannot transmit to a 
Lemma 21. In the graphs G and GA described in Fig. 8, ({TO, TI},E)-reliable trans- 
mission is possible from a to b, but not from b to a. 
Proof. Consider the graph G*(b, TO, T1 ). All the edges of GA are added to this graph, 
thus u,v7, b is a path in G*(b, TO, T,) that misses both TO and Tl. Furthermore, neither 
TO nor T1 is an (a, b)-separating set in G. Thus, by Theorem 12 vertex a can transmit 
a message to 6. However, G*(a, TO, T,) does not contain any authentication edges, and 
ToU TI is an (a, b)-separating set in G*(a, TO, Tl). Thus, by Theorem 13 vertex b cannot 
transmit a message to a. 0 
5. Single-pair reliable communication 
In this section we consider (t, &)-reliable transmission between a given pair of parties 
a and b. We first show that if there is a fault-restricted protocol for every pair of sets 
of size t then there is a protocol that is reliable against every set of size at most t. 
Similar ideas appear in [6]. 
Lemma 22. Iffor every pair ofsets (TO, TI), where ITol, 1 T, 1 = t and To, T, s V\{a, b}, 
the transmitter a can ({TO, Tl} ,E)-reliably transmit a message to b, then there is (I 
(t, E . (:))-reliable protocol in which a transmits a message to b. 
Proof. For every pair of sets (TO, T,) of size t, the transmitter executes the ({TO, T, } , E)- 
reliable protocol. The ({TO, Tl } , &)-protocol is executed although its precondition (that 
either TO or T, contain all faulty processors) might be false. If the precondition does 
not hold, there is no guarantee on the message that b accepts. Furthermore, at the end 
of the execution, the protocol might not specify which message b should accept; in 
this case b accepts some default “error” message. Thus, at the end of the protocol b 
has many messages that it accepted in the different executions; most of them can be 
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garbage but in the executions in which the precondition holds b accepted the message 
transmitted by a. The message that b accepts as the message transmitted by a is some 
message rn’ such that there is a set T,’ of size t, for which b accepts the message m’ 
in the ({T& TI } , &)-reliable protocol for every T, of size t. 
We claim that with high probability m’ was really transmitted by a. Let To be a set 
of size t that contains all Byzantine parties in the execution, and m be the message 
transmitted by a. The probability that one of the ({TO, T,} , &)-reliable protocols has 
failed for some Ti is at most E (y). If none of these executions has failed then 
the combined protocol succeeds: For every T,, the receiver b accepts the message m 
in the ({To, Tl} , .s)-protocol. Assume that there is a set TA such that b accepts the 
same message m’ in the ({T& TI } , e)-protocol for every T, . In particular b receives the 
message m’ in the ({To, TA} , &)-protocol, and m = m’. 0 
Using the fault-restricted characterization from the preceding section, we prove the 
following: 
Theorem 23. There is a (t, &)-reliable protocol in which vertex a can transmit a mes- 
sage to vertex b if and only if for every TO, T1 C V \ {a, b} such that IToJ, ITI 1 = t, 
the set TO U T, is not an (a, b)-separating set in G*(b, TO, TI ). 
Proof. If there are sets TO, TI c V\{u, b} such that ITo/, IT, 1 = t and the set TOUTI is an 
(a, b)-separating set in G*(b, TO, TI ), then by Theorem 13 the receiver a cannot transmit 
a message to b with reliability less than l/2. On the other hand, if the conditions of 
the theorem hold then G is (t + l,a, b)-connected (if T is an (a, b)-separating set in G, 
then T is an (a, b)-separating set in G*(b, T, T)), and by Lemma 22 and Theorem 13 
a can transmit a message to b. 0 
6. Privacy from reliability 
In this section we consider private and reliable communication, i.e., transmission in 
which the adversary should not learn any information about the transmitted message. 
For this, we have to assume that the reliable channels, represented by the communi- 
cation graph G, are private: the adversary has no information on the messages sent 
on the channel (u,v) unless it controls u or v. We present a general protocol for pri- 
vate and reliable transmission that succeeds if G is (t + 1, a, b)-connected and reliable 
communication is possible. A very similar protocol appeared previously in [9]. We use 
this protocol to show that for both all-pairs and single-pair, the sufficiency condition 
for reliable communication from a to b and from b to a is a sufficient condition for 
reliable communication with privacy. 
We formally define private transmission. In the following definition %?r denotes 
the communication received by a set T during an execution of the protocol. This 
communication is a function of the transmitted message, the random inputs of the 
A. Beimel, M. Franklin I Theoretical Computer Science 220 (1999) 182-210 207 
vertices, and the authentication keys. The communication %r also depends on the 
strategy of the adversary. Informally, a protocol is perfectly private if the probability 
distribution of %‘r is independent of the message. The protocol is b-private if for every 
two messages mo,ml, the distance between the probability distribution of ‘%‘:r(mo) and 
qT(rnl) is at most 6. Formally, 
Definition 24 (Private Protocol). A message transmission protocol is d-private against 
a set T if for every strategy of the Byzantine set T and every two messages mo,ml, 
the set T cannot distinguish which message was sent: for every set of keys {k,,,,: 
(u,v) E EA;U E T} and every two sets of random inputs {yu : u E T} it holds that 
The probabilities are taken over the random inputs of the parties in V \ T and the keys 
of pairs of parties in V \ T. The sum is over r the set of all possible communications. 
A message transmission protocol from a to b is (t,6)-private if it is h-private against 
every set TC V\{a,b} f o size at most t. A protocol is perfectly t-private if it is (t,O)- 
private. 
We do not consider privacy without reliability, since that condition could be met 
by a protocol without any messages. We next present the outline of the protocol for 
private message transmission. The exact protocol is described in Fig. 9. The protocol 
uses the fact that there are t + 1 disjoint paths from a to b in G, and that a and b 
can communicate reliably without privacy. In the first step of the protocol a sends a 
different random one-time pad on each of the t + 1 paths to b in G. Using reliable 
non-private communication and randomized hashing, a and b determine which pads 
have been received correctly by b (Steps (iii)-(v) of the protocol). Then a encrypts 
the message using the sum of the pads that pass the test, and sends this encryption 
to b reliably and non-privately. We use universal hashing [2, 191 for the randomized 
hashing, and perform all arithmetic in a large finite field F. 
We first argue that this protocol is reliable with high probability. 
Lemma 25. Assume that IFI >3n/& and each reliable non-private transmission is 
(t, g/3)-reliable. Then, Protocol PRIVATE-TRANSMISSION is (t, E)-reliable. 
Proof. If both of the reliable non-private transmissions are successful, then ~7,s: = 
$‘,s/” for all 1 <jbt+l, and Ga,za = G b ,z . b The probability that ci # cj for any given 
j E G* is at most l/IF/, since it can only happen when b randomly chooses the unique 
Yj such that r; = (d; - dT)/(cT - cj). But m” = mb unless cy # cj for some j E G’. 
To summarize, the transmission fails only if one of the reliable non-private trans- 
missions fail, or cy # cj for a j E G”. Thus, the probability that Protocol PRIVATE- 
TRANSMISSION fails to be reliable is at most (2e/3) + [(t + l)/IFI] <a. 0 
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PROTOCOL PRIVATE-TRANSMISSION 
(i) Along each disjoint path j in G (where 1 <j< t + l), the transmitter 
a sends to b the values c,“,d,” ER F. 
(ii) Let cJ”, dj be what b receives on path j, 1 <j <t + 1. 
(iii) Using the reliable non-private communication protocol, b transmits to a 
the values r$‘, s/b, 1 <j < t + 1, where rJ” ER F and s/h = $‘c; + dj. 
(iv) If a detects that the reliable non-private transmission has failed, it terminates 
the protocol. Otherwise, let r;,.sJ?, 1 <j d t + 1, be what a receives. 
(v) Using the reliable non-private communication protocol, a transmits to b 
the values Ga,za, where Ga = {j : s4 = rycy + d,“} and za = ma + xjtcO c,;. 
(vi) Let Gh,zh be what b receives. 
Ivii) Vertex b accepts the message mb = zb - CjEGh ci. 
Fig. 9. A protocol for private transmission of a message. 
We argue that the protocol is private with high probability. The idea of the proof 
is to notice that the adversary does not hear the communication on at least one path 
j*, thus has no information on the value of c;*. This implies that the adversary has no 
information on CjtcO I 8 and therefore on the transmitted message which is masked 
with this sum. 
Lemma 26. Assume that each reliable non-private transmission is (t, E/3)-reliable. 
Then, Protocol PRIVATE-TRANSMISSION is (t, 2E/3)-private. Furthermore, if each 
reliable non-private transmission is perfectly detecting then the protocol is perfectly 
t-private. 
Proof. There are at most t Byzantine parties, so there exists a path j* with no faults 
on it. We assume that the adversary hears the messages sent on the t remaining paths 
(this assumption might only help the adversary to get more information about the 
transmitted message). 
First consider a communication “/ heard by T in an execution in which the reliable 
non-private transmission of Step (iii) of the protocol has succeeded. We argue that 
the probability of y is the same whatever the transmitted message m is. First of all, 
since the protocol is independent of m in Steps (it(iv), then for every strategy of 
the adversary, the set Ga is chosen independently of m. The adversary’s only source 
of information about the transmitted message is za. For every m there is exactly one 
value of xi,__. cJ! that is consistent with m and za. Furthermore, the adversary knows 
the value cjec.,lj*) CT and the values rja, and s/“* = r+cJa* + dye. I.e., given the 
information of the adversary, for every m there is exactly one value for pair c/“* ,dy. 
that is consistent with the communication y, that is cJ”* = m - za - xiEGa,fjll c/” and 
d? = se - r$cy*. Since c,“* and dy% are chosen uniformly and independently, the 
p;obabil& that CT(m) = y is independent of m. 
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If the reliable non-private transmission protocol is perfectly detecting then Steps (v)- 
(vii) are executed only when the transmission of Step (v) has succeeded and Protocol 
PRIVATE-TRANSMISSION is perfectly private. 
However, if the reliable non-private transmission from b to a fails without being 
detected then privacy may be threatened. A partial disruption of this transmission (while 
otherwise following the protocol honestly) could cause Ga to contain only paths on 
which there is a fault. This could allow the adversary to learn c/” for every j E G”, 
and hence determine ma from za. Let rfa,l be all the communications of Protocol 
PRIVATE_TRANSMISSION in which the transmission in Step (iii) failed without a 
detecting it. Thus, 
C IPr[V7-(m0) = rl - PriY7+1) = ?I1 
xi- 
= YEG lPrWdm0> = ~1 - WYdw > = rll 
a, 
, 
< Pr[ Step (iii) fails for mo ] + Pr[ Step (iii) fails for ml ] 
<;E. 
Thus, by Definition 24, Protocol PRIVATE_TRANSMISSION is (t,2&/3)-private. IJ 
Lemma 26 and Theorem 3 imply the following: 
Theorem 27. Let G be a graph describing u network of reliable and private channels. 
If the graph G is (t + 1 )-connected and the graph G u GA is (2t + 1 )-connected, 
then for every s>O there is an efJicient protocol for (&&)-reliable and perfectly t- 
private message transmission between any pair of parties which uses a (2,~/(6nt))- 
uuthentication scheme. 
Theorem 23 implies a similar result for single-pair transmission. Since Protocol 
TRANSMIT is not perfectly detecting, then the protocol is not perfectly private and 
with small probability the adversary can learn which message was transmitted by a. 
Notice that Protocol PRIVATE-TRANSMISSION requires reliable transmission in both 
directions. This cannot be avoided; if reliable and private transmission is possible from 
a to b then reliable transmission is possible from b to a (a transmits to b a secret key, 
b uses this key to authenticate the message and sends the authenticated message on 
t + 1 disjoint paths which must exist). 
Theorem 28. Let G be a graph describing a network of reliable and private channels. 
rf.for every TO, TI C V \ {a, b) , such thut ITo], 1 Tl/ = t, the set TO U T, is not an (a, b)- 
separating set in the graphs G*(b, TO, T,) and G*(a, TO, T,), then for every E > 0 there 
is a protocol for (t, E)-reliable and (t, 2&/3)-private message transmission between a 
and b. 
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